May Feature

The Fallacy of People Problems, and How to Solve Them - continued

An example at a medical device company illustrates the effects of unbalanced consequences. When analysts were asked to analyze some issues in the shipping process, they discovered a huge back-order problem. Surprisingly, the products on back order were not special orders, but the company’s highest-volume items. No one understood why these products were on back order until we looked into the incentive plan in the production department. The plan rewarded volume based on skewed criteria, i.e., the production of odd lots of less-common products. The consequences for the production department were out of balance with those for the organization, rewarding performance that harmed the company. Employers frequently fail to understand that consequences are never universally rewarding or punishing; the reward or punishment is in the eye of the performer. An employee recognition program that offers a personal lunch with the company president as a reward might discourage as many people as it attracts. One company recounted that it had tried three times to conduct such a program, only to see it backfire every time because the rewards weren’t attractive to employees. The first time, the rewards were too trivial (free magazine subscriptions). The second time, the rewards were too extravagant (a $5000 reward that led to fraud and corruption). The third time, the reward was just plain strange (pizza with the president?). In pharmaceutical manufacturing, the system often has built-in consequences that punish employees for spotting problems and engaging in root-cause analysis. In many firms, the first person to notice a deviation “owns” it and is held responsible for assembling a team, gathering data, carrying out a problem analysis, and, in many instances, writing up the investigation report. For many, these are seen as negative consequences—onerous tasks to perform on top of regular responsibilities. Such consequences also thrust the individual into the spotlight, where his or her actions are subject to close scrutiny by management. In addition, the production department may exert pressure to finish the analysis and get back to making product, and colleagues may resist the investigation, concerned that the analysis will reveal their own shortcomings. Instead of being a systematic process of gathering and arraying data, the analysis may be a knock-down fight among people with conflicting vested interests. Being caught in the middle can be unpleasant. Given all this, it is no wonder that many people are reluctant to acknowledge to notice deviations.“Problem? I don’t see a problem.” On the other hand, letting something slip usually has few, if any, negative consequences for employees in the short term. It is easy—and all too common—for production staff to think, “As long as the batch meets specifications, who will ever know if a step was skipped or reversed, or if a signature was affixed during the process or after review? And if the batch does fail to meet specifications, three to six weeks may pass before that happens, and two years may go by before a patient complains. Whatever happened or didn’t happen will be long forgotten by then.” The existence of so many negative consequences and the lack of positive short-term consequences frequently discourage employees from reporting deviations. One company recently received a patient complaint that a one-inch bolt appeared in a sealed bottle of capsules. The company’s investigators traced the bolt back to a hinge arm on a cottoner machine used right before the bottles were sealed and capped. It was a very specific bolt; there was only one like it in the plant. If the bolt had worked itself loose, it could have fallen into a bottle before the cotton was inserted. Interestingly, the nut that had been attached to the bolt was never found. No doubt, someone had found that nut, looked at it, and tossed it into the trash without writing it up in the batch records or reporting it to anyone. And someone must have noticed that the cottoner wasn’t working correctly because the hinge arm was missing a bolt and a nut. They must have replaced it without recording the repair. When the complaint supervisor was asked how probable it was that her people could have done this, she rolled her eyes and said, “Don’t ask, don’t tell.” Finally, one should consider how feedback factors into the performance system model. If no one ever tells employees about the consequences of their responses, they will continue to do what they have been doing. If everyone knows the production department’s average yield, yet no one has any idea what the reject rate is, the message is clear that yield is important and reject rates are not. Similarly, if no one explains during SOP training precisely why one can’t skip step 3.2.5.4 or what effect skipping it would have on grinding, mixing, and encapsulation, employees are not likely to be vigilant about that step. Finally, if the only real feedback is a yearly list of generalities followed by a modest monetary reward, what behavior can be expected to change? End note The performance system model leaves room for retraining as a corrective action for a people problem, but only when the deficiency truly lies with the performer. Even in such cases, retraining is not necessarily the best option. Some people are simply not trainable, some skills are not transferable, and the optimal solution is rarely “more of the same.” The most effective corrective actions for performance problems involve addressing one or more elements of the performance system: the balance of consequences; the feedback mechanisms; and the stated goals, targets, and objectives. In short, the best solution to so-called people problems is for management to make it clear to all employees that quality, in all its aspects, is the organization’s number-one priority. This message can’t be delivered with words and slogans; it must be threaded throughout each element of the performance system. And, perhaps most importantly, management needs to tackle the causes of people problems with as much rigor and analytical precision as it applies to its most challenging mechanical or chemical ones. References 1. C.H. Kepner and B.B. Tregoe, The New Rational Manager (Princeton Research Press, Princeton, NJ, 1997), p. 33. PT